TikTok’s U.S. Chief Security Officer, Will Farrell, told the House Select Committee on Sept. 15, 2026, that ByteDance retained ownership of TikTok’s recommendation algorithm after the January 2026 divestiture of its U.S. operations. According to Farrell’s prepared testimony, ByteDance kept the core algorithm intellectual property, raising questions about whether the divestiture fully removed Chinese control over TikTok’s technology.
Under the January 2026 divestiture, ByteDance retained ownership of TikTok’s core recommendation algorithm intellectual property, according to Will Farrell’s prepared testimony submitted to the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. Farrell, TikTok’s U.S. Chief Security Officer, explained that while TikTok’s U.S. operations were spun off into TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, ByteDance did not transfer or surrender ownership of the underlying algorithm architecture, which is built on ByteDance’s proprietary Monolith framework.
Under the January 2026 restructuring created TikTok USDS as a joint venture in which ByteDance holds a 19.9% stake, with the remainder owned by U.S. and allied investors, according to congressional letters and public disclosures.
The January 2026 restructuring created TikTok USDS as a joint venture in which ByteDance holds a 19.9% stake, with the remainder owned by U.S. and allied investors, according to congressional letters and public disclosures. Although TikTok USDS employees are responsible for reviewing the algorithm’s source code and retraining the recommendation engine on U.S. user data stored in Oracle’s American cloud infrastructure, the intellectual property rights to the algorithm’s architecture, evaluation criteria, and training methodology remain with ByteDance. Farrell’s testimony emphasized that TikTok USDS licenses the recommendation algorithm from ByteDance rather than owning it outright.
Farrell distinguished between the algorithm’s architecture and its parameters, noting that TikTok USDS retrains the model’s numerical weights exclusively on U.S.-based user data, while ByteDance retains control over the design and framework of the system. Oracle serves as a “trusted security partner,” auditing compliance with national security requirements and monitoring how U.S. data is used in the retraining process. Despite these safeguards, the retention of the algorithm’s intellectual property by ByteDance has raised concerns among lawmakers about whether the divestiture effectively removed Chinese control or influence over TikTok’s core technology.
Congressional scrutiny has focused on the potential for ByteDance, as a Chinese company subject to Chinese intelligence laws, to exert ongoing influence through its ownership of the algorithm architecture. Analysts cited in coverage of Farrell’s testimony note that Chinese law obligates companies like ByteDance to cooperate with intelligence services upon request, a legal requirement that persists despite the U.S. restructuring. This has fueled questions about whether ByteDance could modify or update the algorithm remotely, potentially affecting content prioritization on the U.S. platform.
The House Select Committee is expected to explore how U.S. user data flows within the joint venture and whether technical interfaces exist between TikTok USDS and ByteDance-controlled systems. These inquiries build on earlier congressional efforts, including letters dating back to November 2021 that demanded detailed information about TikTok’s algorithm, especially regarding its recommendations to younger users and management of harmful content. TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew previously testified before Congress in March 2023, denying allegations that TikTok shares U.S. user data with the Chinese government, while acknowledging that Beijing-based employees had technical access to U.S. data at that time.
The January 2026 divestiture followed TikTok’s $1.5 billion “Project Texas” initiative, which aimed to segregate U.S. user data from Chinese operations by storing data exclusively in Oracle’s U.S. cloud infrastructure. Farrell’s testimony reiterated that all U.S. user data used for retraining the recommendation model is confined to systems under TikTok USDS and Oracle, with legal and technical barriers designed to prevent access by ByteDance’s China-based operations. Senator Edward Markey’s letter highlighted company pledges that TikTok USDS would conduct source code reviews to detect any “Chinese manipulation” of the algorithm.
Despite these measures, public documentation indicates that TikTok USDS has provided limited updates on the implementation timeline or technical details of these safeguards since the divestiture. The ongoing congressional investigation, including the hearing on September 15, 2026, aims to clarify the extent of ByteDance’s retained control over TikTok’s recommendation technology and the implications for U.S. national security.
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